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It probably never occurs to a New Zealander to have any doubts about his title to the land 
he holds under a land transfer certificate of title. He knows no reason why anyone should 
oust him, nor can he see the possibility of anyone coming along and saying that he has no 
title to his land. 'What is, has been and always has been' is the idea, sub-consciously 
affecting his views on the land question, and questions of title are narrowed down to the 
limited compass of his own immediate experience.' 
Professor Garrow, when writing this, reflected a well-accepted attitude 
within New Zealand society. As E P Wills commented in the early 1960's, 
"most New Zealanders ... adopting the national formula of 'she'll be right' 
have assumed that there are few, if an , difficulties arising from possible 
weaknesses in our [Torrens] system". Y 
Thirty-five years later, the average New Zealander's attitude is probably 
a lot more cynical, if not more realistic. The "compass of immediate 
experience" is no longer as limited as Garrow contemplated. In the early 
1990's our media has ensured full public awareness that fraud and forgeries 
(both of clients' money and of land title documents) are no longer totally 
unusual events. The solicitors' fidelity fund is, at present, being "topped 
up" with contributions of large amounts of money from every practising 
principal within the country, most of whom resent carrying the burden of 
dishonesty of fellow members of the profession. The attitude of "she'll be 
right" is fast diminishing. 
The question of indefeasibility of title - should it be immediate or should 
it be deferred? - has, for many years, but significantly not for the last 15 - 
been a hotly debated topic among academics of property law in New 
Zealand. Under the principle of deferred indefeasibility a title obtained 
fraudulently can be defeated until it is "perfected" by a subsequent bona 
fide transfer for value. In contrast, the immediate indefeasibility theory 
provides that registration will immediately validate a transfer, even if it is 
forged or otherwise void or voidable. This latter theory was confirmed in 
the landmark decision of Frazer v Walkel3 in 1967. Many subsequent 
critical appraisals explored the consequences of the judgment. However, 
little academic writing on the topic is apparent in any of the New Zealand 
periodicals from the mid-1970s. Does this imply that the principle of 
immediate indefeasibility is "set in stone" in this country? If the answer 
is yes, the writer believes there lies therein an inherent danger of late 20th 
century complacency. It would be comforting to believe that a principle set 
in the 1960's can withstand the "tides of time immemorial" but that, in 
itself, denies an acceptance of changing trends and ideas. If we, in New 
Zealand, refuse to relook at the debates that resulted from that 1967 case 
we will be adopting a stance that isolates us from the other Torrens 
jurisdictions. In both Australia and Canada the debate over immediate 
1 J M E Garrow, Luw of Real Property (5th edn 1960) 299. 
2 E P Wills, "Just How Indefeasible Is Your Land Transfer Title" [I9631 NZU 269. 
3 [I9671 1 All ER 649. 
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andlor deferred indefeasibility is very much alive. The last four years have 
seen both look carefully, once again, at the principles enunciated. This 
article looks at the new activity in the indefeasibility field in Australia and 
Canada and the comparative dormancy in New Zealand. It also examines 
the concept of "discretionary indefeasibility" originally advocated in 1977 
by our Property Law and Equity Reform Committee, and subsequently 
considered in Australia and Canada. 
The notion of immediate indefeasibility as a fundamental concept in the 
Torrens system is receiving scrutiny in Australia and the impact of several 
decisipns has forced Australians out of a complacency with which New 
Zealanders at present feel very comfortable. Conveyancers are being 
warned to take extra care to ensure that their clients deal with the actual 
registered  proprietor^.^ Academics are attempting to assess what effect, if 
any, some judgments will have, not only on a well-established principle 
but, more importantly, on an aspiration to achieve a uniform Torrens 
system initially in Australia but foreseeably throughout all Torrens juris- 
dictions. Some Australian thought would suggest that the controversial 
judgments are isolated ones and should be thus regarded, but it is submitted 
that the disturbance is more profound. The consistent reference in these 
recent cases to the possible remedy of personal equities (a remedy which 
effectively disposes of the immediate indefeasibility principle) hints at 
attempts to find a more equitable solution in situations where immediate 
indefeasibility does not produce the fairest result. Some judges appear to 
be prepared to depart from the traditional sanctity of the principle; others 
leave it untouched. 
A brief review of relevant case law in South Australia, Victoria and New 
South Wales highlights the present uncertainty. 
South Australia 
In Daniel1 v Paradiso5 it was held that the fabrication of a standard form 
mortgage and the forgery of one of the signatures on the document rendered 
the mortgage a nullity. As such it was incapable of registration. This 
decision overturned the lower Court's finding that Daniell's conduct es- 
topped him from denying the authority of the fraudster and the execution 
of the mortgage. The question of ostensible authority received careful 
attention. 
Differing interpretations of s 69 (11) of the Real Property Act 1886 have 
fuelled uncertainty. In Wicklow Enterprises Pty Ltd v Doysal Pty Ltd,6 
O'Loughlin J firmly stated that, under s 69(II), the doctrine of immediate 
indefeasibility was to apply if a title was obtained by forgery or by means 
of an insufficient power of attorney. Deferred indefeasibility was only 
applicable when a title was obtained from a person under a legal disability. 
However, in Rogers v Resi Statewide Corporation Ltd? von Doussa 
claimed that the section was designed to protect innocent people who had 
no way of detecting a forgery. If this was its purpose, then immediate 
indefeasibility should not apply to the recipient of a void instrument. The 
4 ANZCR 1991 Issue 1 17 ,507. 
5 (1991) 55 SASR 359. 
6 (1986) 45 SASR 247. 
7 (1991) 29 FCR 219. 
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fact that s 69(II) has no equivalent in other Torrens legislation appeared to 
provide justification for a departure from the accepted stream of authority 
supporting immediate indefeasibility. In a third case, Whittem v Arcadi? 
Debelle J criticised von Doussa J's interpretation of s 69(II), claiming that 
it did not fit well with the rest of the section. The practical effect of von 
Doussa J's interpretation meant that a registered proprietor who takes bona 
fide for value as a result of a forgery is in a lesser position than a bona fide 
registered proprietor who takes in consequence of a fraudulent transaction. 
Debelle J felt that the simplicity Torrens envisaged for our registration 
system was being seriously undermined. In the recent decision in Tsirik- 
olias v Oakes? the court also favoured the approach adopted in Wicklow 
Enterprises. 
Victoria 
Section 44 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 received similar scrutiny. 
In Chusfild Pty Ltd v Taranto,lo despite undeniable similarity in facts to 
Frazer v Walker, Gray J chose not to follow the principle of immediate 
indefeasibility. Like von Doussa, he found justification for his decision in 
the "uniqueness" of s 44. Gray J also used the "in personam" exception 
to attack the validity of Chasfild's claim. This "widening" of the exception 
has not only drawn subsequent academic commentll but is apparent in very 
recent cases.12 
Hayne J interpreted s 44 differently in Vassos v State Bank of South 
Australia.I3 He reaffirmed the concept of immediate indefeasibility in 
Victoria by ruling that a mortgage, although forged, was binding as the 
bank involved had, on registration, acquired an indefeasible title as mort- 
gagee. His Honour submitted that the "labels" of "immediate indefeasi- 
bility" and "deferred indefeasibility" were not principles to be used to 
draw conclusions about the true construction of legislative provisions. He 
also stated that no Torrens title legislation provides for "absolute" inde- 
feasibility of title. Both comments help support the theory of "discretion- 
ary indefeasibility" subsequently discussed in this paper. On the "in 
personam" argument, his Honour emphasised that the remedy should only 
be used in circumstances where equity would regard actions as "uncon- 
scionable or unconscientious". 
In Eade v Vogiazopoulo~~~ Smith J declined to follow Chasfild's case 
and claimed that he was bound to follow the decision in Breskvar v Wall 
wherein it was decided that the relevant Victorian legislation (which 
included the (now) s44(1)) was indistinguishable from its Queensland 
counterpart. He also ruled that the mere forgery of signatures was not 
sufficient to support an in personam claim. 
8 Full Court of Supreme Court of South Australia, Debelle J, 25 September 1992; (1992) 167 LSJS 
n .C 
,511. 
9 Supreme Court of South Australia, Burley J, 15 March 1993. 
lo [I9911 1 VR 225. 
1 1  See, for example: G Teh, "Deferred Indefeasibility of Title in Victoria", (1991) 17 MULR 77; D 
Skapinker, "Equitable Interests, mere equities, and personal equities: distinctions with a 
difference" (1994) 68 ALJ 593. 
12 A G Lang "Immediate Indefeasibility of Title Part 2". (1994) ANZCR 65. This article examines 
two recent cases: Lissa v Cianci & Anor (1993) NSW Conv R 55-667 and Story v Advance Bank 
Australia Ltd & Anor (1993) NSW Conv R 55459.  See also Grgic v Australian and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd (1994) NSW Conv R 55-698. 
13 (1992) V Conv R 54-443. 
14 (1993) V Conv R 54-458. 
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New South Wales 
In New South Wales, the in personam exception has recently been used 
to circumvent the immediate indefeasibility principle. In Mercantile Mu- 
tual Life Znsurance Co Ltd v Gosper15 the mortgagor, Mrs Gosper, was held 
entitled to be "freed" from the commitment of a forged, and registered, 
variation. The force of an "in personam" claim here proved too strong for 
an obvious case of immediate indefeasibility for the bank. Strong dissatis- 
faction with this majority judgment has been subse uently expressed.16 
47 Garofano v Reliance Finance Corporation Ltd a case of a forged 
mortgage, favoured the principle of immediate indefeasibility. Mahoney 
JA emphasised the paramount importance of the act of registration. He also 
failed to find any justification for a personal equity claim. Meagher J 
supported these findings and dealt decisively with the arguments tendered 
to escape the doctrine. With respect to s124 of the Real Property Act (the 
"ejectment" section) he stressed the importance of construing the Act as 
a whole, not "schizophrenically". This traditional approach has been 
reaffirmed in Grgic v Australian and New Zealand Bank.18 
Overview 
Any member of the Australian judiciary cannot feel comfortable in cases 
involving forgery and the Torrens system. Significant academic comment 
is testimony to this.19 While a Court of Appeal decision in New South Wales 
confirms, once again, the principle of immediate indefeasibility, other 
States are still uncertain. The recent cases have, at the very least, shown 
that a blanket application of the doctrine of immediate indefeasibility can, 
in some cases, produce a result that is far from fair and is likely to 
undermine public confidence in the system. When the Torrens system was 
first introduced, the incidence of forgeries was extremely low. Unfortu- 
nately the same cannot be said in the 1990s. A system instigated more than 
a century ago must be made flexible enough to accommodate changes in 
our society. Moreover, it is essential to recognise that the area of law in 
question deals with one of the most important assets of individuals in the 
community - land ownership. Today no-one can realistically expect indi- 
viduals to accept hopelessly inadequate compensation as an alternative to 
their being ejected from their property or, as is more likely, to their 
acceptance of a mortgage commitment. The inflexibility of an absolute 
immediate indefeasibility principle has surfaced and it would be foolish 
not to accept that a practical solution must be found. It is submitted that a 
doctrine of "discretionary indefeasibility" is a constructive alternative.=O 
15 (1991) 25 NSWLR 32; (1992) ANZCR 27. 
16 See P Butt, (1992) 66 AW 596. 
17 Court of Appeal of Supreme Court of New South Wales, Mahoney, Priestly and Meagher JJA, 20 
August 1992. 
18 (1994) NSW Conv R 55498. 
19 See, for example: P Butt, "Shaking the Foundations" (1991) 65 ALJ 61 1; "System Stands on 
Shaky Foundations Australian Law News, JanIFeb 1992,12; (1991) 117 ANZCR 497; (1993) 129 
ANZCR 37; P N Wikrama Nayake, "Immediate and Deferred Indefeasibility Continued" (1993) 
67 Law Institute Journal 393; P N Wikrama-Nayake, "Immediate and Deferred Indefeasibility: 
The Story Continues" (1993) 67 Law Institute Journal 733-735; R Edwards, "Immediate 
Indefeasibility and Forgery Is it what we really want?' (1993) 67 Law Institute Journal 730; P 
Butt, "Indefeasibility and Sleights of Hand" (1992) 66 AW 596; P Butt, "Torrens Foundations 
Stabilised" (1993) 67 AW 535; D MacCallum, "Return to Immediate Indefeasibility of Title" 
(1992) 66 Law Institute Journal 970. 
20 J Schultz, "Judicial Acceptance of Immediate Indefeasibility in Victoria (1993) 19 MULR 326, 
suggests that "the disadvantage of this approach lies in the lack of certainty and costs involved in 
removing that uncertainty in a particular case". 
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The previous discussion of Australian activity in the immediate indefea- 
sibility field must be of significant relevance in all Torrens jurisdictions. 
In Canada, a recent revival of the debate is evident. Sadly, New Zealand 
appears to be lagging behind in this contemporary thought. No recent cases 
on indefeasibility in this country suggest any hint of unsettledness - in 
every case, the principle of immediate indefeasibility is enforced, irrespec- 
tive of any possible - and remediable? -unfairness. A detailed analysis of 
several recent cases shows that, in some instances, strict adherence to one 
inflexible doctrine can produce a less than ideal solution. 
Morrison v BNZ2' 
Mr and Mrs Morrison were joint owners of a property in Coatesville. In 
1987, they contracted to purchase a property in Browns Bay for $715,000. 
Settlement date was set for three months later during which time it was 
anticipated that they would sell their Coatesville property for approxi- 
mately $400,000. This sale did not eventuate as quickly as expected, and 
Mr Morrison approached the Bank of New Zealand, with whom he dealt 
often in various business transactions, and was granted a commercial bill 
facility for $600,000 to enable the purchase of the Browns Bay property. 
Mr and Mrs Morrison attended the Bank and signed this, even though Mrs 
Morrison expressed anxiety at the amount involved. Shortly afterwards, 
however, there was also executed a memorandum of mortgage given by 
Mr and Mrs Morrison to the Bank, the security for which was the Browns 
Bay property. Mrs Morrison denied ever signing this, and the inference was 
drawn that her husband forged her signature. Later he also apparently 
forged her signature on a commercial bill acceptance discount facility. The 
marriage then came to an end and the matrimonial property was divided 
up. Part of the settlement involved the sale of the Browns Bay property. 
Mrs Morrison claimed that only then did she became aware of the mortgage 
to the Bank of New Zealand. The property was sold, a first mortgage to a 
nominee company was paid off, and other expenses were met. The bank 
made claim to the remaining $220,000. The plaintiff, Mrs Morrison, 
claimed, inter alia, that the mortgage was void or otherwise invalid on the 
grounds of her husband's forgeries. 
The discourse on this area of law in the case is significant for its brevity. 
The defendant naturally submitted that the bank was entitled to complete 
protection because the mortgage, although forged, had been registered, 
relying on ss 62 and 183 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 and Frazer v 
Walker.22 In comparison to the Australian cases discussed earlier, no debate 
on this issue ensued. Counsel for the plaintiff accepted that he was "con- 
strained by the principle in Frazer v Walker [and had to] concede the 
validity of the mortgage, because of its registration, notwithstanding that 
the plaintiff did not execute the mortgage".23 He then proceeded on a 
different tack, suggesting that the Court should consider the issue of a 
"course of dealings'' between the parties. Accordingly this case unequivo- 
cally accepts the principle of immediate indefeasibility. 
21 [I9911 3 NZLR 291. 
u [1%7] 1 AC 569. 
23 [I9911 3 NZLR 291 at 294. 
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Criclilewood Holdings Ltd v C V Quigley & Sons Nominees Ltd24 
Quigley, a solicitor in partnership, and two of the plaintiffs set up a 
company, called Farmshare, to buy and sell farms. Cricklewood Holdings 
Ltd, a subsidiary to this company, had a capital of $10,000. Quigley and 
one of the plaintiffs, two of the ten shareholders, owned just more than 80% 
of the shares. Quigley organised a loan of $300,000 to be made on a second 
mortgage to Cricklewood Holdings. This was arranged through his firm's 
nominee company, the clients involved being entirely unaware of the 
transaction. The monies were drawn and fraudulently used by Quigley for 
his own purposes. The mortgage document may well never have been 
registered, if it had not been discovered in its unregistered state by 
Quigley's other partners when later dealing with a prior unregistered 
mortgage involving Cricklewood Holdings and BNZ Finance. Innocently, 
the other partners saw to it that the nominee company mortgage was 
registered. The BNZ mortgage was registered subsequently. The plaintiffs 
sought, inter alia, an order declaring the mortgage to the nominee company 
void on the grounds that Cricklewood had not authorised it, had not 
executed it, and it had been obtained by fraud on the part of Quigley. The 
second plaintiffs (Norbert-Munns, McBride and BNZ Finance) sought 
priority for the BNZ mortgage claiming that the exception of fraud in s 62 
of the Land Transfer Act 1952 should be invoked with respect to the 
nominee company mortgage. 
The decision is interesting on several counts, but comment here is 
confined to the discussion on s 62 of the Land Transfer Act. It was held 
that Quigley was not acting as agent for the nominee company. Referring 
to the case of Assets Co Ltd v Mere R ~ i h i ~ ~  and other more recent judgments 
on the same issue, Holland J concluded that Quigley's fraud could not be 
"brought home" to the registered proprietors, as Quigley was not acting 
within the scope of his authority. Accordingly, his Honour ruled that the 
nominee company mortgage should not be displaced or declared void as it 
did not come within the exception laid down in s 62. 
Although on a different tangent from the Australian cases on forgery, 
this is a good exposition of the workings of immediate indefeasibility in 
New Zealand. A desire to adhere to established principles, even if unfair- 
ness may occur as a result, is evident. Holland J seems to be comfortable 
in claiming that ''the authority in Assets Co v Mere Roihi has never been 
challenged since it was decided in 1905".26 
Jessett Properties Ltd v UDC Finance Ltd2' 
Capital Investments Ltd was registered proprietor of a property which 
was mortgaged to ANZ Bank, and was leased to Now Investments Corpo- 
ration Ltd. The lease (never registered) was mortgaged to UDC Finance. 
Now Investments ceased paying rent to Capital, and Capital went into 
arrears with its mortgage payments to ANZ. ANZ entered into an agree- 
ment for the sale of the property to a Mr Wallis as trustee for a company 
yet to be formed. Mr Wallis was a director of Now Investments. The sale 
was completed with Thara Holdings Ltd being the transferee. A lease was 
then executed between Thara Holdings and Jessett Properties Ltd. The 
transfer was registered and, although not clearly stated in the judgment, it 
24 [I9921 1 NZLR 463. 
25 119051 AC 176. 
4 - - -  
26 i i9921i  NZLR 463 at 479. 
27 [I9921 1 NZLR 138. 
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is presumed that so also was the lease. Then UDC was advised of the 
purchase and lease which, if upheld, would effectively deprive UDC of its 
security. UDC sought an order that Thara, the new registered proprietor, 
held the property subject to both the lease from Now Investments and the 
accompanying mortgage. Also, claiming that Jessett had knowledge of the 
circumstances, UDC sought an order to make Jessett's interests also subject 
to the lease and mortgage. At first instance, an interim order was granted 
preventing any further dealings by Jessett and Thara with respect to the 
property. The hearing in the Court of Appeal was to deal with the issue of 
whether there was a serious question to be tried. 
The Court of Appeal confirmed that there did exist an arguable case that 
Wallis' fraud was Thara's fraud. It concluded that the evidence available 
suggested that Wallis sought to defraud UDC in his capacity as agent for 
Thara. Once again, the principle of immediate indefeasibility was the 
essential issue here. Interestingly enough, the term was never used through- 
out the judgment. The Court considered it sufficient to say that, for UDC 
to succeed, fraud would need to be proved in terms of s 62 and s 182 of the 
Land Transfer Act. 
This in itself provides a curious reflection on the Courts' attitude in New 
Zealand. The assumption that immediate indefeasibility rules supreme was 
not challenged. Rather, detailed arguments were given to decide whether 
the element of fraud involved was sufficient to enable the exceptions in s 
62 and s 182 to be utilised. It was finally held that Wallis' knowledge of 
UDC's interests could be imputed to his principals, and that there was thus 
an arguable case that Wallis' fraud (which was not disputed) was indeed 
Thara's fraud as well. The Court also ruled that, although there did not seem 
to be any tangible evidence of an agency relationship between Wallis and 
Jessett, it seemed mete also to protect the position of UDC against any 
adverse action of Jessett. 
Fairness would seem to have prevailed. It is not disputed that the seeming 
collusion of the parties to deprive UDC of its interest falls squarely within 
the ambit of fraud as interpreted in the Land Transfer Act. Maybe that is 
sufficient, but the lack of reference to the indefeasibility principle when 
plainly Thara is registered on the title assumes unquestioned acceptance. 
If the same fact situation had arisen across the Tasman, would the judgment 
have been more exploratory? Moreover, if fairness can be impugned here, 
why should the result in Cricklewood's case be so different? 
Dungey v M~Cal lurn~~ 
In 1982, the appellant's husband applied for the second time to settle his 
matrimonial property as a joint family home. His declaration that he was 
able to pay all his debts pursuant to s 3(1) of the Joint Family Homes Act 
1964 was subsequently discovered to be false. However in the interim the 
property was settled as a joint family home and when the appellant's 
husband died, the appellant was registered as sole proprietor of the property 
in 1985. The first respondent, who had earlier sued the appellant's husband, 
commenced actions against the estate and obtained default judgment for 
$61,530. As the estate was insolvent, the Official Assignee was appointed 
as administrator. In 1990 on application by the appellant, the joint family 
home settlement was cancelled. The first respondent applied to have it 
cancelled again. 
28 [I9931 3 NZLR 551. 
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The first respondent had applied for a second cancellation in order to 
benefit from the protection provided for creditors under the Joint Family 
Homes Act 1964. However the Court held that a second cancellation was 
not possible and that once the settlement was cancelled, the provisions of 
the Act no longer applied. Thus it was held that the appellant's claim to the 
property depended on the provisions in the Land Transfer Act 1952. 
Indefeasibility of title under ss 62 and 63 of the Act meant that she was 
completely protected. It is made quite clear in the judgment that this would 
not have been the result if the settlement had not been cancelled. Hardie 
Boys J referred to Gallen J's reliance, during the High Court hearing, on 
Oficial Assignee v District Land Registrar for WellingtonZ9in which was 
firmly rejected the argument that those registered as proprietors under the 
Joint Family Homes Act were protected by the provisions of the Land 
Transfer Act. It was ruled that the Joint Family Homes Act contained 
provisions which clearly envisaged a distinction between indefeasibility 
under the Joint Family Homes Act and indefeasibility under the Land 
Transfer Act 
While it is submitted that any other interpretation of the Joint Family 
Homes Act might lead to its misuse, the incongruity which arises from two 
different constructions of the concept of indefeasibility (a term which 
incidentally is almost always associated with the Land Transfer Act) does 
not enhance our legislative provisions. If immediate indefeasibility were 
not so absolute, it would be unnecessary for our judiciary to find itself faced 
with two diametrically opposed principles. 
While the other causes of action go beyond the scope of this article, it is 
interesting to note that because the appellant had obtained a title under the 
Land Transfer Act, any reliance on s 60 of the Property Law Act 1952 
would necessarily require proof of fraud on the part of the registered 
proprietor. Appropriate allegations were not made in this context, and thus 
the cause of action was struck out. It would maybe have been interesting 
to witness an argument on this score in the light of previously mentioned 
cases. 
Disher v Farnworth30 
The appellant and respondent were beneficiaries under a will which 
provided for a property to be subdivided into two parts. Mrs Disher was to 
inherit the higher part, Mrs Farnworth and another the lower part, and there 
was to be a restrictive covenant preventing a two-storey house being built 
on the lower part. Mrs Disher met with the surveyor and ensured that in the 
unit title subdivision there was included a height restriction restricting 
building to a single-storey house of minimum height, such restriction being 
more stringent than was contemplated by the will. The necessary registra- 
tion was completed. Mrs Farnworth's architect drew up plans in accordance 
with the will but not in accordance with the more stringent requirements 
on the unit title. After some altercation Mrs Disher issued proceedings for 
an interim injunction to prevent Mrs Farnworth proceeding further with her 
construction which had already started. Mrs Farnworth, while removing 
earlier caveats, asked for declarations which, inter alia, would allow her to 
increase the height of her building. 
29 Court of Appeal, Wellington, 18 March 1971, CA 22/70. 
30 [I9931 3 NZLR 390 (CA). 
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In the High Court it was concluded that Mrs Disher owed Mrs Farnworth 
a fiduciary duty to ensure that the latter knew that the height restriction as 
it appeared on the unit title was greater than was contemplated by the will. 
Other matters not particularly relevant in this context were also discussed. 
On appeal, the question of fiduciary duty was addressed. Within this 
context there naturally arose the issue of indefeasibility of title, and the in 
personam exception. Because the transfers had been registered (the caveat 
which had been lodged by Mrs Farnworth when the titles were still in the 
executrix7 name had, for unexplained reasons been removed) Mrs Disher 
had an indefeasible title which entitled her to an undivided share of the 
common property which of course now included disputed airspace. Coun- 
sel for Mrs Farnworth, considering the case of Secureland Mortgage 
Investments Nominees Ltd v Hannan & Co Solicitor Nominee Co Ltd3' 
sought to overcome this problem by using the in personam exception. As 
the Court had already overturned the High Court's finding of a fiduciary 
obligation, it dealt with this argument very laconically: 
In the present case there is no contract between the parties, and Mrs Disher has not entered 
into a fiduciary relationship. It follows that Mrs Disher has acquired an indefeasible title.32 
Such a pithy dismissal of the in personam exception accords with other 
recent New Zealand judgments on indefeasibility. It substantiates the 
attitude that this principle has had its ambits defined and these must be 
applied without enquiry. While the circumstances differ markedly, it is 
difficult to ignore the extensive debates which ensued in Gosper and other 
Australian cases where the judiciary seemed so uncertain of the ambits of 
this exception. The confidence - or is it over-confidence? - of our courts 
is now questionable. 
Decisions on forgery cases in Canada have shown a marked preference 
for the concept of deferred indefeasibility. The Canadian judiciary has 
favoured the idea that the title of a person who has obtained registration as 
a result of a forged instrument should be defeasible. The basic reasoning 
behind this is that there exists no enactment which enables the registered 
right of a person under a null deed to be protected by the rule of indefeasi- 
b i l i t ~ . ~ ~  Canada thus still appears to be holding out against the tide of 
opinion that followed the Frazer v Walker decision. However, in 197 1, a 
case in Canada returned an unexpected decision favouring immediate 
indefeasibility. This case is examined, together with the accepted line of 
decisions that places Canada very much in the deferred indefeasibility 
camp. 
Deferred indefeasibility decisions 
Di Castri lists three categories within which the indefeasibility principle 
appears to fall:34 
1. B forges A's name to a transfer purporting to be from A to B. The 
transaction is as void under the appropriate land le islation as it would 
be at common law: Re Adams and McFarland. 3sg 
31 [I9911 2 NZLR 399. 
32 Ibid, at 401. 
33 Di Castri, Registration of Title to Land ,(1987) Carswell, 760. 
34 Ibid, at 758-9. 
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2. B forges A's name on a transfer transferring land from A to C and C 
obtains registration. If no further transfer of the land takes place C, 
although entirely innocent, loses the land and A redeems ownershi 
Shetler v ~ o s h a ~ ; ~ ~  Pik Har Kwan v Kinsey: Morisseau v Kinsey. Y+ 
If the land has been transferred again, the new registered proprietor 
keeps it and A must resort to monetary compensation: Brown v 
Broughton. 38 
3. Mortgage forgery: C is registered as mortgagee by A forging the 
signature of the original registered proprietor B, or C, a bona fide 
purchaser for value, is registered as mortgagee by A forging and 
registering a transfer to himself. In the former case the mortgage is 
deemed a nullity, in accordance with the principles applied to a 
transfer in similar circumstances. In the latter situation, however, the 
mortgage survives because the fraud cannot be "brought home'' to 
C or his agents: Pik Har Kwan v Kinsey: Morisseau v ~ i n s e ~ ? '  De 
Lichtbuer v ~u~rneier?' 
The in personam exception 
Canadian authorities address the in personam exception as seriously as 
their counterparts in Australia. It is suggested by Di Castri that its presence 
mitigates the split between immediate and deferred indefeasibility. It is 
significant to note that Canada relies heavily on Australian authority to 
emphasise the point that the uncertainties surrounding this exception leave 
wide open the possibility of its use, should immediate indefeasibility lead 
to an unfair result. Ironically it is in the New Zealand case of Frazer v 
Walker where this was so clearly suggested by Lord Wilberforce after 
laying down the principle of immediate indefea~ibility:~~ 
In doing so they ( their Lordships) wish to make clear that this principle in no way denies 
the right of the plaintiff to bring against a registered proprietor a claim in personam, founded 
in law or in equity, for such relief as a court acting in personam may grant. 
Hermanson v Martin 
While generally the Canadian Courts have preferred to apply a policy of 
deferred indefeasibility, in Hermanson v Martin42 the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal opted for immediate indefeasibility. Following a divorce, one of 
the joint owners sold the matrimonial home. That owner instructed his 
solicitor to prepare a transfer and was correctly told that his ex-wife would 
also need to sign it. The husband returned with a person whom he intro- 
duced as being his ex-wife and the document was duly signed by both. The 
transfer and accompanying mortgages were registered. Of course the 
woman was an imposter and the wife's signature was thus a forgery. At 
first instance, McIntyre J decided to follow Frazer v Walker and Assets Co 
v Mere R ~ i h i ~ ~  and thus ruled that the bona fide purchaser was protected 
35 (1914) 6 WWR 1076 (Alta). 
36 (1915) 8 WWR 852. 
37 (1979) 10 RPR 44 (BCSC). 
38 (1915) 8 WWR 889. 
39 (1979) 10 RPR 44 (BCSC). 
\-----,- 
41 ~razk;v ~alker[1%7] 1 AC 569,585. 
42 [I9821 6 WWR 312; [I9871 1 WWR 439. 
43 [I9051 AC 176. 
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against any adverse claims. Indeed, this was a clear enunciation of imme- 
diate indefeasibility. He rejected the argument that interpretation of the 
relevant sections in the Saskatchewan Act suggests deferred indefeasibil- 
ity. He stated that "[I]ndefeasibility of title is made an incident of regis- 
tration ... and where a bona fide transferee for value succeeds in having his 
interest registered, the fact of registration is conclusive ...".44 
This case went on appeal in 1986. The appeal was dismissed on the same 
grounds of conclusiveness of title, but comments made by Brownridge JA 
suggest that the principle may be qualified:45 
Finally, there are no doubt cases where the registered owner, having been deprived of his 
title by forgery or fraud, should have his title restored. But this is not such a case. The issue 
in this case is about indefeasibility of title and the present registered owner has been the 
registered owner since 29th May 1975. It is neither just or equitable that he should now be 
deprived of his title because of the fraud of others if that can be avoided. As Lord Wilberforce 
pointed out in Frazer v Walker, there is nothing to prevent the court from granting equitable 
relief as the circumstances require even if it cannot or feels it ought not to take away the 
title of the present registered owner and restore it to a former owner .... 
Exactly what type of "equitable relief ' Brownridge JA contemplated is 
not made clear. If, however, he was intending to confine such relief to 
monetary compensation, the comments made in the first sentence of the 
above extract make no sense. Rather, this is a statement supporting the idea 
that solutions for fraudforgery cases should be "just and equitable" for 
all the parties involved. His interpretation of Frazer v Walker is refresh- 
ingly wide. 
In the light of this decision both in the first instance and then on appeal, 
the Canadian courts have been required to decide whether to continue to 
advocate their theory of deferred indefeasibility, or to "change tack" and 
adopt the alternative concept of immediate indefeasibility. To their credit, 
thought has also been given to related issues, not the least of which is the 
in personam exception. There appears to be a definite reluctance in most 
Canadian states to change their orthodox stance. In British Columbia the 
re-enacted Land Registry Act (1 979), admittedly before the Hermanson 
decisions, adopted language obviously designed to infer deferred indefea- 
sibility. Similarly, in 1971 the Annual Suwey of Commonwealth Law46 
made statements suggesting that the basic flaw of immediate indefeasibility 
was that it made "all titles to land ... precarious". If the reader feels that 
attitudes would have changed following the Hemnson decision, Di Castri 
suggests 
However, assuming further that the legislature's current view favours deferred indefeasi- 
bility, it is suggested that s 277(2) [Land Registry Act, Saskatchewan] be suitably amended 
to remove any doubt as to its ambit. If, on the other hand, the theory of immediate 
indefeasibility should gain legislative acceptance, then the case of "the unlucky mortga- 
gee" who takes a mortgage from a registered owner who turns out to be a fictitious person 
(Gibbs v Messer) should also be examined .... Finally, it may be observed that the principle 
of law reform requires there to be a compelling reason to change an established rule of 
common law [Heydon's Case (1584), 3 Co Rep 7b]. 
As has been most aptly said by a Canadian writer:48 
44 Ibid, on Appeal. 
45 Ibid 455. 
46 Annual Survey of Commonwealth Luw (1971), 236. 
47 See above note 34 at 760. 
48 J Lee, "Registrar of Regina Land Registration District v H e m s o n  et Al" (1988) 52 Sask L Rev 
303. 
Fraud and Forgery in the 1990s: Can our Adherence to 
Fraser v Walker Survive the Strain? 
Maintaining an appropriate balance between the unique legal regime of the Torrens system 
of land registration and the general doctrines of Anglo-Canadian law has always been a 
challenging task for the Canadian judiciary. The smouldering contradictions between 
Torrens law and the general law have traditionally ignited most fiercely over the principle 
of indefeasibility of title. 
While the Hemzanson case may have come close to upsetting the balance 
in Canada generally, it seems evident that the concept of deferred indefea- 
sibility still predominates. 
The Torrens jurisdictions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada display 
a disturbing lack of uniformity in these recent indefeasibility decisions. The 
Australian and Canadian courts appear ready to apply the concept of either 
immediate or deferred indefeasibility as appropriate in the circumstances, 
and each case is considered on its own facts. Some decisions, however, 
appear irreconcilable. This may explain the sudden expansion of the in 
personam exception. The New Zealand judiciary still pursues the tradi- 
tional acceptance of immediate indefeasibility, and is reluctant to depart 
from this under any circumstances. 
The struggle in Australia and Canada to adopt a humane approach has 
inadvertently helped widen the rift between immediate and deferred inde- 
feasibility. The two schools of thought still stand rigidly apart and each 
case construed on its circumstances bespeaks expensive and time-consum- 
ing litigation. All this places an "undue strain on the cornerstone of 
indefeasibility registration without fraud7 .49 
It is significant that all three countries have, at some stage, had commit- 
tees investigate this controversial area.50 In New Zealand the plethora of 
dissatisfaction following the decision in Frazer v Walker demanded this; 
in the other two countries, a desire to create a uniform Torrens title was the 
motivating factor. The cases reviewed in this article glaringly neglect the 
resulting, and remarkably similar, recommendations. The essential theme 
underlying the reports is "fairness" ; the problem arising from them is how 
best to serve this ideal. The emphasis is expressed most clearly in the 
following ~tatement:~' 
In the case of forged instruments, there may be some cases in which the rule of immediate 
indefeasibility yields a harsh result, and some cases in which it produces a satisfactory result 
(or, more accurately, would produce a satisfactory result if the compensation provisions 
were adequate). Similarly, where instruments are void for some reason other than forgery, 
there could be some cases where the rule of immediate indefeasibility would be satisfactory 
(eg Mardon v ~o l loway52)  and other cases where it would be unsatisfactory (eg Boyd v 
Mayor of Wellington53). 
49 P Butt (1992) 66 A U  596. 
so New Zealand: Report: Property Law and Equity Reform Committee The Decisiotl in Frazer v 
Walker June 1977. Australia: Victorian Law Commission Report on tlze Torrens Register Book 
Report No 12, 1987. Canada: Joint Titles Committee Renovating the Foundatiotl: Proposals for a 
Model Recording and Registration Act for the Provinces and Territories of Canada, July 1990. 
Alberta: Proposals for a Land Recording and Registration Act for Alberta Report No 69, Alberta 
Law Reform Institute, October 1993. 
51 New &land: Report: Property Law and Equity Reform Committee Tlze Decision in Frazer v 
Walker June 1977.9. 
52 [I9671 NZLR 372. 
53 [I9241 NZLR 1174. 
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The Property Law and Equity Reform Committee in New Zealand 
offered the following solutions for the law relating to the registration of 
forged and other void instruments. 
(a) Discretion be given to the High Court, in cases where any void 
instrument has been registered, to either order that the former regis- 
tered proprietor's name be restored to the register or to declare that 
the title of the person who registered the void instrument be indefea- 
sible. 
(b) Appropriate changes be made to the compensation provisions in the 
Act. 
(c) Detailed guidelines be provided in any amending legislation outlining 
matters which should be taken into account, but not restricting matters 
which the Court may see fit to consider. 
(d) The anomaly which exists with respect to a fictitious person (the ratio 
decidendi in Gibbs v Messer having been reduced to this, but not 
eliminated) be removed. 
This element of court discretion was also introduced in the Victorian and 
Canadian reports. 
The Victorian Law Commission recommended the adoption of the 
principle of deferred indefeasibility where forged instruments were in- 
volved. To the question of ''which party should be given the land and which 
should be compensated" it felt it would be "more likely that compensation 
[would] be adequate for the innocent third party than for the person whose 
title [was] altered".54 However, it also recommended that if adherence to 
this deferred indefeasibility principle resulted in undue hardship, the Court 
should be able to reverse the result. 
In Canada, the 1990 report made it clear that a strict following of the 
Frazer v Walker principle was "too rigid and [was] likely to have unfair 
results".55 TO overcome this problem, it introduced the term "discretionary 
indefeasibility". Section 5.6(3) of the Model Act sets out a general rule 
whereby a displaced registered owner resumes ownership and the new 
registered owner receives the compensation (the deferred indefeasibility 
rule). However the Committee accepted that this rule should not be inflex- 
ible. It acknowledged that circumstances do vary and that, in some cases, 
it may be fairer and cheaper to leave the land with the new registered 
proprietor and compensate the one who has been displaced. In s 5.6(4) the 
Court is given power and necessary guidelines, comprising a set of listed 
circumstances, to do this, if it considers it more "just and e q ~ i t a b l e " . ~ ~  The
list of circumstances are simple, sensible and very much in line with 
modern-day living. They comprise:57 
(i) The nature of the ownership and the use of the property by either of 
the parties. 
(ii) The circumstances of the invalid transaction. 
54 Victorian Law Commission, op cit n 50, p 11-12. With respect to J Schultz' criticism, see above 
n 20. 
55 Canada, op cit n SO, p 1 .  
56 lbid p 26. 
57 Ibid p 109. 
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(iii) The special characteristics of the property and their appeal to the 
parties. 
(iv) The willingness of one or both of the parties to receive compensation. 
(v) The ease with which the amount of compensation for a loss may be 
determined. 
(vi) Any other circumstances which, in the opinion of the Court, may 
make it just and equitable for the Court to exercise or refuse to 
exercise its powers under subsection (4). 
These recommendations have been adopted by the Alberta Law Reform 
Institutes8. 
Generally, these proposals come close to achieving the two, sometimes 
diametrically opposed, purposes of the Torrens system: the provision of 
security of ownership while maintaining facility of transfer so that a 
purchaser can become a registered owner quickly, cheaply and safely. Their 
adoption places the immediate/deferred debate in an entirely different 
perspective. The Canadian and Australian reports favoured deferred inde- 
feasibility subject to a discretionary right of the Court. The New Zealand 
committee found "no compelling reasons ... for changing the law relating 
to indefeasibility of title as stated in Frazer v Walker" and felt it should 
remain "subject to the abrogation of the decision in Gibbs v Messer and 
subject to introducing legislation [as s~gges ted]"~~ In the final analysis, 
the problem is solved. No matter from which direction it comes, the element 
of Court discretion provides the flexibility necessary to achieve consistent 
fairness. 
ss Op cit n  50. 
59 Opcitn50,pl l .  
